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Security Policy ​

Supported Versions ​

Only the latest release is supported with security fixes.

Reporting a Vulnerability ​

Please report security vulnerabilities privately through GitHub's Report a vulnerability form: https://github.com/livesport/homer/security/advisories/new. Do not open public issues for security reports.

There is no bug bounty program.

Accepted risks ​

Weaknesses a scanner will legitimately keep reporting, which the maintainers have consciously decided not to fix. Each row names the decision record that argues the trade-off — the ADR is the authority, this table is the index.

Record a risk here at the same time as the decision, not when a scanner first raises it: the security intake automation reads this file and docs/adr/ to avoid opening a ticket for something already settled.

FindingWhereDecisionWhy accepted
The output cap counts kept bytes, not raw process output: a command whose output is entirely dropped by claudeDropSystemSubtypes cannot trip maxOutputBytes (CWE-770, CVSS 5.3)LineFilteringOutputStream, all four ShellExecutor backendsADR-0063The run stays bounded by its timeout and the filter's memory is constant, so the failure mode is bounded CPU and I/O rather than exhaustion. Counting raw bytes would kill the runs the filter exists to keep alive. No confidentiality or integrity impact; reaching the path needs an authenticated Action.RUN.
A Claude session with more than 1 000 model calls is charged the spend endpoint's best figure observed at poll time while its later calls remain unpriced, so the recorded cost can understate actual spend (CWE-693/CWE-400, CVSS 2.3)LlmHarnessExecutor.accountAttempt capped-poll branchADR-0061, amendment 2026-09-16Every session figure priced from a capped poll is forced to an incomplete: fallbackReason, visible in the status API and spans, so the under-count is never silent, and no path charges below the best session figure observed. Lifting the cap would let crafted stdout drive the full poll schedule. Reaching the path needs an authenticated Claude run and favorable ingestion lag.
The one-shot E2E runner receives the Artifactory read credentials as container environment, visible to docker inspect and to every process in the container for its lifetime (CWE-526, CVSS 4.8)docker-compose.e2e.yml e2e-runner.environmentDOCKER.md § Artifactory build secretsNo principal is crossed: the CI job that holds the pair starts the container itself, and the container runs this repo's own test suite, not agent code. A /run/secrets file plus an entrypoint shim would only hide the pair from docker inspect / docker exec, which need root-equivalent daemon access that can read the secret file or /proc/1/environ anyway; Gradle's test workers inherit the shim's env, so in-container code still sees it. Revisit if the runner ever executes untrusted code.
An ancestor directory of a packed file can be swapped for a symlink between the pack walk's containment check and addFile's by-name open, so a file outside the upload root can enter a downloaded archive (same-UID TOCTOU; NOFOLLOW_LINKS binds only the final component) (CWE-59/CWE-367, CVSS 2.3)TarStreams.addDirContents + TarStreams.addFile (pack path, all transports); WorkspaceSync.uploadDirInto + uploadFile (ssh SFTP upload)ADR-0047, amendment 2026-09-23No principal is crossed: the race needs a concurrent writer holding the runner's own UID, which can already read every file it could disclose. Closing it needs an openat-style dirfd walk plus an fstat on the opened handle, neither of which java.nio exposes portably (ADR-0047 rule 6). Escaping symlinks are skipped, the walk descends on the checked realpath, hard links are skipped, so the exposure is confidentiality-only at the runner's own UID.
A target or ancestor directory of an extracted file can be swapped for a symlink between the extract walk's containment check and its by-name open, so sync-down can write a file outside the workspace (same-UID TOCTOU; the directory branch must follow contained links) (CWE-59/CWE-367, CVSS 5.8)TarStreams.extractEntry directory branch (Kubernetes sync-down, external-runner tar download)ADR-0047, amendment 2026-09-30No principal is crossed: the tar stream cannot create links (link entries are skipped), so the race needs a concurrent writer holding Homer's own UID, which can already write every file it could reach. Closing it needs an openat-style dirfd walk plus fstat, which java.nio does not expose portably; a point-of-use re-check only narrows the window and costs a realpath walk per entry. The single-file branch writes with NOFOLLOW_LINKS; its own residual, the mode normalization, is the next row.
A single-file download's target can be swapped for a symlink between the NOFOLLOW_LINKS write and the mode normalization, which the JDK applies to the link's destination even through a NOFOLLOW_LINKS view, so the destination's mode becomes 0755 or 0644 (same-UID TOCTOU) (CWE-59/CWE-367)TarExtraction.extractEntry single-file branch (Kubernetes and external-runner single-file download)ADR-0047, amendment 2026-11-05No principal is crossed: the race needs a concurrent writer holding Homer's own UID, which can already change the mode of every file the link could lead to; the write itself still refuses a link. Closing it needs an fchmod on the write's descriptor, which java.nio does not expose; creating the file with its final mode is defeated by the umask and by an overwritten file keeping its mode.
A caller cancelled while a LangGraph inspect/state interpreter runs keeps its permit, the child and its readers until the child exits or the 15 s timeout fires, because the wait is one blocking waitFor (CWE-772, CVSS 5.3)runBoundedGraphSubprocess (ProcessGraphInspectRunner, ProcessGraphStateRunner)ADR-0073, amendment 2026-10-09Cancellation gives no amplification: an uncancelled caller holds the same single permit and interpreter for the same bounded time. Total work stays capped by the four permits per service and the 5 s queue shed, which cancellation cannot bypass, and the process-group reap still runs when the wait returns. No confidentiality or integrity impact; reaching the path needs an authenticated grant.
A deeply nested brace pattern exhausts the stack while braces compiles it, so whoever shapes a glob pattern can stall the process (CWE-674, CVSS 8.7)braces 3.0.3 ← micromatch 4.0.8 ← fast-glob 3.3.1 ← @next/eslint-plugin-next, dev-only lint toolchainADR-0088, amendment 2026-10-17No patched braces, micromatch, fast-glob or @next/eslint-plugin-next release exists yet, and the package is a transitive development dependency, so it ships in no image (the console image carries only the .next/standalone trace). The only patterns it compiles are the repository's own ESLint globs — repository-controlled input, never untrusted data — so no principal is crossed. Revisit when a fixed release ships.

Released under the Apache License 2.0. Documentation for 1.43.0.